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HOW WILL THE DPJ CHANGE JAPAN?
Tobias Harris
By any measure, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 generalelection in a historic landslide. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) seat to-
tals fell from 219 single-member districts to sixty-four, and seventy-seven propor-
tional-representation seats to fifty-five. Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, lost
ten seats, including all eight of the single-member districts it had won in 2005.1
The DPJ’s likely coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party of Japan and Peo-
ple’s New Party, basically stayed put: the former returned with the same number
of seats, while the latter fell one seat, to three.
THE 2009 GENERAL ELECTION
The DPJ’s victory was not necessarily a sur-
prise—surveys of the three hundred single-member
districts by major daily newspapers conducted prior
to the general election had predicted that the DPJ
would likely receive over three hundred seats—but it
is impressive nonetheless. But what explains it? How
was the DPJ able to go from a party crisis after the
2005 general election to winning the largest majority
won by a party in the postwar era? After all, not only
did the DPJ suffer a blow in 2005 when it managed to
win only 113 seats, but within months of the election
Seiji Maehara, the young party leader who took over
for Katsuya Okada after the party’s defeat, was forced
to resign after he tried to use a fraudulent e-mail con-
nected to the 2005 candidacy of Takefumi Horie, the
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now-disgraced executive of the company Livedoor, to attack the Koizumi gov-
ernment. The e-mail scandal raised serious questions about the political abili-
ties of DPJ politicians and brought the party to the brink of destruction.2
Naturally, the decay of the LDP is a major factor in explaining that party’s
2009 defeat. Former prime minister (2001–2006) Junichiro Koizumi, the major
factor in the LDP’s 2005 victory, was out of office a year after that general elec-
tion, and he was followed in the succeeding three years by three prime ministers
who were notoriously unable to deliver on the party’s 2005 manifesto. As the
Twenty-first Century Rincho, a group of nine private-sector think tanks, indus-
trial organizations, and labor unions, concluded, the LDP had largely failed at
implementing its 2005 agenda; the group noted that in the four years since the
last general election, the Japanese had become more impoverished and the gov-
ernment had done nothing to address widening inequalities. The government of
Prime Minister Taro Aso, who had been prime minister since 2008, was criti-
cized in particular for its economic stimulus program, which pushed back the
day when the government might be able to achieve a balanced budget, without
providing much help for the Japanese economy.3
This criticism gets to the heart of the Liberal Democratic Party’s decline.
While corruption scandals and a string of embarrassing gaffes by prime minis-
ters and cabinet ministers undoubtedly damaged its reputation, the Japanese
people deserted the LDP because of the sense that it had failed at addressing the
marked decline in the quality of life of the Japanese people over the past two de-
cades, especially the past decade. One measure of this decline is Japan’s ranking
in per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which was third in the world as re-
cently as 2000 but as of 2007 was nineteenth. Despite Japan’s having experienced
between 2000 and 2007 its longest period of growth since the end of World War
II, few Japanese benefited from the export-led boom, which constituted what
Kohei Ootsuka, a DPJ member of the upper house and vice minister of the cabi-
net office in the Hatoyama government who had worked at the Bank of Japan
before entering politics, has called an “illusory recovery.”4 Indeed, even as Ja-
pan’s economy grew, Japan rose to second in the world in its poverty rate, which
measures the number of people who earn less than half the median income.5
During the same decade, the number of nonregular employees rose to more
than a third of the Japanese labor force. Japanese, long accustomed to thinking
of their society as uniformly middle class, were forced to confront serious in-
equalities, and they felt increasingly insecure about the future as Japanese soci-
ety continued to age and shrink and as the future of the government services
grew more doubtful, especially after the 2007 pensions scandal.
But many of these trends were apparent before the 2005 general election,
meaning that the LDP’s 2005 victory was anomalous. Arguably, independents in
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particular turned to the LDP in 2005 not because of the particulars of the LDP
agenda—it is unclear that voters in 2005 cared about postal privatization, de-
spite Koizumi’s making the election “about” postal privatization—but because
Koizumi signified a new type of politics in which the LDP’s traditionally
“immobilist” politics would give way to more dynamic, top-down leadership.
Many of the same independent, “floating” voters concluded this year that after
three years during which the LDP reverted to its pre-Koizumi ways (symbolized
by the readmission less than three months after Koizumi left the premiership of
the “rebels” he had ousted) the DPJ was a better choice than the LDP. In both the
2007 upper-house election and this year’s general election, the DPJ has, accord-
ing to exit polls, been supported by a majority of independent voters.6 In this
year’s general election, the trend penetrated even LDP supporters, nearly 30 per-
cent of whom supported the DPJ. Not only had the LDP lost the ability to appeal
to independents—its support among independents fell from roughly 32 percent
in 2005 to 15 percent in 2009—but it could not even unify its own base.
Still, the LDP’s collapse is only part of the story: after all, voters did not have
to turn out and vote for the Democratic Party of Japan. They could have stayed
home entirely, as many did in the elections between 1993 and 2005, turnout fall-
ing below 60 percent in 1996 and 2003, with 1996’s 59.65 percent the lowest ever
for a general election. The other part of the story of the 2009 election is the
transformation of the DPJ into a party that the Japanese people felt could be
trusted with power “at least once.”
Much of the credit for that transformation goes to Ichiro Ozawa, who served
three years as party leader from Maehara’s resignation until Ozawa himself was
forced to resign in May 2009 due to a campaign finance scandal involving one of
his aides. During those three years Ozawa—regarded as an electoral master-
mind, due to lessons he had learned as the protégé of the LDP’s Kakuei Tanaka
(prime minister 1972–74)—handpicked the party’s candidates, trained them in
the art of campaigning, and traveled the country on their behalf in both the 2007
upper-house election and the general election, during which he held the party
title of acting president responsible for elections.
The reality is that the DPJ forged a national brand, based upon the party’s
manifesto. Regardless of the district, DPJ candidates campaigned on the same
agenda. Unlike the LDP, the DPJ waged a relentlessly positive campaign, focused
on its own policy proposals instead of criticism of LDP rule. A sign at a DPJ cam-
paign office in Okayama’s second district said precisely that, reminding staffers
that the campaign was “not to bad-mouth the LDP candidate and other candi-
dates.” The DPJ’s campaign was based not only on its policy agenda but also on
its desire to convey an impression of youthful vitality. It helped that a consider-
able majority of the DPJ’s 271 candidates in single-member districts were fifty
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or younger, the largest cohort being candidates in their late thirties, followed by
those in their late forties. The average age of DPJ candidates was 49.4, compared
to 55.5 for the LDP. The DPJ also ran more female candidates—forty-six to the
LDP’s twenty-seven—and far fewer hereditary politicians, only thirty-two ver-
sus 109 for the LDP. (Nearly 50 percent of the LDP’s winning candidates in 2009
were hereditary politicians, compared with only 10 percent for the DPJ.) At least
on the symbolic level, the DPJ’s victory signifies the introduction of new blood
into Japanese politics.
It is difficult to say, however, what role the DPJ’s policy proposals played in
voters’ decisions to vote for the DPJ. One Asahi Shimbun poll found that only 24
percent of respondents felt that “regime change”—that is, a DPJ victory
—would make Japanese politics better, while 56 percent felt it would leave
things unchanged.7 Another Asahi poll asked respondents to comment first on
whether the LDP would be able to pay for its promises, then whether the DPJ
would be able to pay for those it made. The numbers were the exact same for
both parties: 8 percent felt that each party would have the funds to cover its
promises, while 83 percent were skeptical.8
That is to say not that policy was irrelevant but that the DPJ’s specific propos-
als arguably mattered less than its “narrative,” which can be captured in two slo-
gans: seiken kotai (regime change) and seikatsu dai-ichi (lifestyle, or livelihood,
quality of life, first). The first encapsulates the party’s plans to change Japan’s
system of government, while the second stresses that its focus will be on the pub-
lic’s standard of living, in contrast to the LDP’s focus on simple economic
growth (“GDP-ism”) and other, noneconomic matters (constitution revision,
for example, which was the number-one issue in the LDP’s manifesto for the
2007 upper-house election). Whatever voters thought about the DPJ’s specific
proposals in these areas, it appeared to be more dynamic than the Liberal Demo-
crats and promised effective leadership, with the goal of easing the public’s eco-
nomic insecurities. That proved to be a winning formula.
CAN THE DPJ GOVERN JAPAN?
Now that the DPJ has taken power, with Yukio Hatoyama becoming only the
fourth non-LDP prime minister since 1955, the question is whether the DPJ can
deliver on its promises regarding administrative/political reform and economic
reforms in the public interest.
Seiken Kotai
There is no doubt that the DPJ’s proposals related to administrative reform are
central to the party’s program—without administrative reform, genuine change
is impossible. As Katsuya Okada, foreign minister in the present government
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(that of Yukio Hatoyama), writes in his book Regime Change, in order to imple-
ment reforms the DPJ will first have to reform Japan’s system of government,
strengthening the cabinet at the expense of the bureaucracy.9 Accordingly, the
first major point (of five) in the DPJ’s campaign manifesto concerned “cutting
waste,” which in practice means introducing a new policy-making system char-
acterized by top-down political leadership by the cabinet, an arrangement that
will enable the DPJ-led government to control the budgeting process and reallo-
cate Japan’s 207 trillion–yen budget as it sees fit.10
Arguably, the DPJ’s proposals on administrative reform are the most devel-
oped aspect of the party’s program. Perhaps this focus reflects lessons learned
from the 1993–94 coalition government of Morihiro Hosokawa, the first
non-LDP government, in which many DPJ leaders participated. That seven-
party coalition was formed without any idea as to how to formulate policy. As
one Western scholar writes of the Hosokawa government: “One important fac-
tor contributing to the coalition’s collapse is that it came to power not only with-
out an agreement on its goals other than passing political-reform legislation, but
without an agreement on a process for deciding what its policies should be.”11
The result was a government that governed much like the LDP, with the cabinet
weak relative to the ruling parties. The bureaucracy was able to exploit the con-
fusion and interfere with the government’s plans.
The DPJ has also learned from the pathologies of the Liberal Democratic sys-
tem of government.12 LDP rule was characterized by extensive collaboration be-
tween the bureaucrats and politicians. However, contrary to the idea that LDP
rule meant bureaucratic rule, as has been argued, LDP rule was in fact character-
ized by close cooperation through backbenchers, via the party’s internal organi-
zations.13 The result was a proliferation of veto points within the government,
what has been called Japan’s “Un-Westminster” system—that is, in contrast to
Britain’s Westminster system, characterized by a strong executive and top-down
policy making: “The executive in the Japanese governing structure is bound by
this advance screening-cum-prior-approval process that makes the LDP and its
PARC [Policy Affairs Research Council] a vital veto point for all major policies
and legislation. Unlike the norm in Westminster systems, the party is not subor-
dinate to the executive. It is a parallel structure with equivalent if not superior
powers because of its right of veto.”14
As policy made its way up the LDP’s hierarchy, it also moved up the bureau-
cratic hierarchy, with differences among ministries being hammered out in
meetings of administrative vice ministers held the day before cabinet meetings,
ensuring that the cabinet’s role would be perfunctory. The cabinet and prime
minister under LDP rule were thus hemmed in by both the bureaucracy and the
ruling party structure. As another Western scholar wrote at the time, “The
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ruling party, not the executive, is the only political institution with sufficient
power to bargain and negotiate with bureaucrats. Policy originates in the bu-
reaucracy and is then subjected to political intervention by the PARC.”15
It was only the exceptional LDP prime minister who was able to circumvent
this system—and once such a presidential-style leader left office, the system re-
verted to the status quo ante.
Accordingly, the DPJ now intends to build a new policy-making system that
subordinates the bureaucracy, the ruling party, and the Diet to the cabinet, at the
expense of both the bureaucracy and the ruling party, in order to produce more
dynamic, top-down government. That is, the DPJ intends to build a new system,
not simply to depend on having a capable leader in the prime minister’s chair.
Most important, the DPJ wants the cabinet to be responsible for producing the
budget, without which policy change is impossible.
Appropriately, given that Japan has an “Un-Westminster” arrangement, the
DPJ has studied the British system as a model for what it hopes to build in Japan.
It does not want to copy the American system of controlling the bureaucracy
through a vast number of political appointees; instead, it wants to free political
leaders from dependence on the bureaucracy while still taking advantage of Ja-
pan’s high-quality civil service for the benefit of the country. (Ozawa makes this
distinction in his 2006 book.)16 More recently, Naoto Kan, a founder and former
leader of the DPJ (who became famous as health minister during the mid-1990s,
when he took on his ministry’s bureaucrats in response to a tainted-blood scan-
dal), visited the United Kingdom in June 2009 and produced a report on the op-
erations of the British executive after speaking with officials from the Labor and
Conservative parties. In this report and an article in the journal Chuo Koron,
Kan expressed his admiration for the British cabinet system. He singled out Brit-
ain’s cabinet committees as particularly worthy of emulation, as in his assess-
ment they would enable ministers to work together in small groups to produce
policy—especially the budget.17 Cabinet committees would move Japan away
from the custom of unanimity in cabinet decisions, effectively giving each min-
ister a veto.
How does the DPJ plan to move Japan in the direction of a true Westminster
system? Central to the party’s administrative plan is a new national strategy bu-
reau (NSB) that will be headed by a senior cabinet minister and staffed with
roughly thirty appointees, including ten Diet members. The NSB’s primary
function will be to manage the budgeting process. At this point, however, it is
unclear precisely how the NSB will operate. Kan has already been named the
NSB’s head; he will simultaneously serve as the deputy prime minister. Little else
is known. The NSB could be a superministry or cabinet within the cabinet, di-
recting the work of other ministries, an arrangement that could be problematic
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for the new government. Alternatively, it could be a support group for the work
of cabinet committees, following their leads.18
Whatever form the NSB takes, the DPJ is trying to centralize power even
within the cabinet. The DPJ took a step in that direction by announcing its ap-
pointees for the top cabinet positions within a week of the election victory. Ac-
cording to a transition plan drafted in 2003 by a committee responsible for
administrative preparations, within five days after an election the DPJ was to
convene a transition team and quickly appoint party members to senior cabinet
positions. It has now done so, appointing Okada as foreign minister, Hatoyama
confidante Hirofumi Hirano as chief cabinet secretary, Kan as deputy prime
minister and NSB chief, and Hirohisa Fujii as finance minister. The cabinet’s se-
nior officials will be at the heart of an “inner cabinet” that will move decision
making away from the current system in which, as we have seen, bureaucrats can
exercise effective veto power in the council of administrative vice ministers and
through unanimous decision making within the cabinet.19 Indeed, upon taking
power the Hatoyama government abolished the administrative vice ministers’
meetings; it will likely replace them with meetings of parliamentary vice minis-
ters. The new government also immediately established new regulations govern-
ing contact between bureaucrats and politicians not holding cabinet or
subcabinet appointments. The regulations will require bureaucrats to make the
contents of all requests from Diet members known to their ministers, and it
bans, in principle, efforts by bureaucrats to influence Diet members. The gov-
ernment has also mandated that bureaucrats save records related to requests
for subsidies, licenses, contracts, and the like from backbenchers or their
secretaries.20
Another major feature of the DPJ’s administrative reform is a proposal to ap-
point more than a hundred politicians to government posts. Both Ozawa and
Kan have expressed their admiration for the British system’s inclusion of so
many legislators in the executive, and the DPJ clearly intends to do the same. To
enforce the idea of political teams overseeing the work of ministers, the DPJ has
already stated that cabinet ministers will be free to choose their own deputy
ministers and parliamentary secretaries—unlike LDP rule, under which the
party’s factions played dominant roles in distributing subcabinet jobs even as
their power to appoint cabinet ministers and select the prime minister de-
clined.21 One problem with this proposal, however, will be finding enough DPJ
members qualified to take up positions in the government.
Revealingly, when the Hatoyama government took power, the DPJ dissolved
its policy research council, making clear that the cabinet’s role in policy making
is superior to that of the party. Similarly, by giving Ozawa the position of party
secretary-general, the Hatoyama government hopes to neutralize the ruling
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party as a policy actor. Ozawa will be responsible for Diet affairs and election
strategy, meaning that he will control what under LDP rule were four different
posts, none of the occupants of which were in the cabinet. The DPJ has rolled the
LDP’s many “veto points” outside the cabinet into a single veto author-
ity—Ozawa, as secretary-general. In Diet strategy, Ozawa will be responsible for
assigning committee positions, appointing the leaders of the two houses, and,
crucially, distributing the party’s political funds. In short, he will act as the
party’s chief whip, ensuring that backbenchers follow the cabinet’s lead; control-
ling the party’s campaign funds, he will have the power to reward and punish.
Ozawa will be the critical hinge between cabinet and ruling party, and between
ruling party and Diet, the indispensable actor in moving Japan to a Westminster
system, in which “the line of policy-making authority is top-down: prime minis-
ters normally carry their cabinets, cabinets nearly always carry the parliamen-
tary party and the parliamentary party counts on carrying parliament.”22 Ozawa
will be responsible for carrying the parliamentary party and parliament.
Giving Ozawa such broad powers is risky. He is notoriously mercurial and se-
cretive in his decision making. As secretary-general of his Japan Renewal Party
in 1993–94, he was instrumental, through his political maneuvering, in both
building and destroying the Hosokawa government. In 2007, as the DPJ’s presi-
dent, he entered into negotiations with the LDP for a grand coalition without se-
curing the approval of the DPJ beforehand, for which he resigned temporarily
from the party’s leadership before being coaxed back. Ozawa has said that he re-
grets decisions he made during the first non-LDP coalition government—espe-
cially decisions to alienate the Socialist Party, which resulted in its joining a
coalition with the LDP—suggesting that he may have learned from his mistakes.
Some have warned, however, that Ozawa, through his help for DPJ candidates,
seeks to create an Ozawa “army” that will play a role in the DPJ similar to the role
played by the Tanaka faction in the LDP during the 1970s and 1980s.23 Although
there is no evidence thus far that Ozawa seeks to build a faction that will domi-
nate the DPJ, his past makes it difficult to rule out the possibility entirely.
Ozawa himself has said that he will respect the power of the cabinet and not use
his position to veto the plans of the government. If he abides by this pledge, he will
thereby make the cabinet stronger and the ruling party weaker. But there are few
checks on Ozawa’s power, other than the appointment to the cabinet of DPJ politi-
cians distant from him, ensuring that the cabinet will not passively accept insub-
ordination by him. There is no denying the risk that Ozawa could, far from
unifying the cabinet and the ruling party as DPJ plans state, create a power center
outside the cabinet and therefore resurrect the worst pathologies of LDP rule.
Even as the DPJ has entrusted Ozawa with the task of pacifying the ruling
party and the Diet, there is still the question of how the DPJ will deal with the
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bureaucracy, even with its new-model cabinet in place. It will surely face resis-
tance from the bureaucracy. A Western scholar observes, “Japanese bureaucrats
control a great deal of information due to the absence of staff support either in
the party organizations or among politicians themselves. Information is power
and Japanese politicians are heavily dependent on bureaucrats for information,
especially given that think tanks and other alternative sources of information
and expertise are so weakly developed.”24 Leaks by bureaucrats to the media un-
der the Hosokawa government were at least a factor, if not the primary factor, in
its demise, and bureaucrats will certainly try again to destroy a non-LDP gov-
ernment through leaks and sabotage, helped by a sympathetic conservative me-
dia and the opposition LDP.25
But working in the DPJ’s favor is the idea that there is no such thing as “the
bureaucrats.” The bureaucracy is by no means a monolithic entity; opposition to
the DPJ will differ by ministry. The finance ministry will likely become an ally of
the new government, simply because it shares the party’s goal of cutting waste.
The DPJ’s appointment of Fujii, a former ministry bureaucrat and finance min-
ister under the Hosokawa government, sends a signal to the ministry that while
the DPJ government stands for political leadership, that politicians will now
take the lead on budgeting—a point that Fujii himself has made quite forcefully
in his public appearances—the new government nevertheless hopes to work
with the finance ministry. In the months leading up to the general election, se-
nior finance ministry officials met frequently with senior DPJ figures, suggest-
ing that the ministry is willing to find a way to work with its new political
masters. At the other extreme are ministries like those of agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries; land, infrastructure, transportation, and tourism; and health, la-
bor, and welfare. These ministries enjoyed considerable power and sizable bud-
gets under LDP rule and were “protected” from scrutiny by the LDP’s policy
elements (many of which were among what Koizumi referred to as the “opposi-
tion forces” during his effort to change the LDP).
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries is particularly threatened, as the DPJ has
proposed to replace the baroque system of agricultural subsidies with a more
transparent scheme of income supports that will remove much of the ministry’s
discretion. This ministry was fighting publicly with the DPJ well before the gen-
eral election. In June, Ichide Michio, its administrative vice minister, publicly
called the DPJ’s proposal “unrealistic,” prompting Hatoyama to respond that in
Britain “he would be sacked immediately.”26
Demanding resignations will be one way for the DPJ to respond to bureau-
cratic resistance. It has dropped a radical proposal in its transition plan that the
new government would demand the resignations of administrative vice
ministers and some bureau chiefs and reappoint them only upon receiving
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affirmations that they would accept the party’s policy agenda. The proposal also
called for ending seniority promotions. But even if the DPJ does not go that far,
it will still try to use the cabinet’s constitutionally granted right to appoint and
dismiss administrative personnel in order to fight back against bureaucrats. For
example, the DPJ plans to review the LDP’s choice for director-general of a
newly created consumer-affairs agency and possibly dismiss him.27
The DPJ will have the public on its side when it comes to administrative re-
form. A recent Fuji-Sankei poll asked which policies should be implemented: 87
percent of respondents approved of “Reviewing the relationship between politi-
cians and bureaucrats” and “Reviewing the compilation and execution of bud-
gets.” The DPJ will have to be skillful in communicating via the media—the
bureaucrats certainly will be. But tremendous public support for administrative
reform is an important weapon in the party’s arsenal.
Seikatsu Dai-ichi
As Okada and others have argued, administrative reform is only a first step.
What the DPJ will do once it reforms the policy-making process is more uncer-
tain. The party faces a threefold challenge: it has to develop a sustainable basis
for economic growth while building a new social safety net and reducing the
government’s debt burden.
The party manifesto, of course, includes pages upon pages of policy proposals
under the headings of “Child Raising and Education,” “Pensions and Health
Care,” “Decentralization,” and “Employment and the Economy.” Some of these
proposals are quite good, provided the DPJ can find a way to pay for them. The
DPJ’s proposal to provide 26,000 yen per month per child until middle-school
graduation should have a beneficial effect on domestic consumption and the
birthrate. The income-support plan for agriculture—which will compensate
farmers if the price of a commodity falls below the cost of producing it—should
be a politically acceptable way of supporting Japan’s aging and shrinking popu-
lation of farmers. The party also has a number of apparently sound proposals for
strengthening the pension and health-care systems, the top priority for most
Japanese voters.
If the DPJ’s proposals are strong on a new safety net, they are weaker on eco-
nomic growth and fiscal reform. The statements of its leaders suggest the party
recognizes that the challenge is to move Japan away from its export-dependent
model of growth, the bankruptcy of which was exposed in the latest crisis, in
which the American recession dragged Japan’s economy into a recession of its
own, thanks to a dramatic collapse of exports. Japan needs a more balanced
growth strategy that features both domestic consumption—especially of ser-
vices—and the export of high-value-added goods. It needs to find a way to
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release the cash savings of Japanese households (roughly 1.5 times Japanese
GDP) and bank reserves into the economy so as to promote more growth.
Similarly, proposals to raise the minimum wage to 1,000 yen/hour and to ban
in principle the use of “dispatch” workers (temporary workers supplied to em-
ployers by private firms) in the manufacturing sector could result in more man-
ufacturers relocating production overseas, as could the DPJ government’s
insistence on a 25 percent cut in CO2 emissions by 2020. The party’s proposal to
lower corporate tax rates for small- and medium-sized enterprises could be use-
ful for encouraging such companies, which are largely in Japan’s inefficient ser-
vices sector, to become more efficient and profitable, but that will take more
than tax cuts.
Also, the DPJ will still have to find a way to shrink Japan’s national debt with-
out raising consumption taxes, which the party has promised not to do for at
least four years. The party will, of course, try to cut as much waste from the bud-
get as it can; however, according to at least one party member with a finance
ministry background, the DPJ cannot be sure how much money it will be able to
find and cut. Meanwhile, although the overwhelming majority of Japanese gov-
ernment bonds are held domestically, a fact that buys the government some time
(and enables it to sell more debt, as necessary), the government cannot depend
on debt financing forever.28
All this may represent an impossible trinity of challenges: fixing the govern-
ment’s finances while also building a safety net and shifting the economy to a
more balanced growth model may simply be out of the question, whoever is in
charge. Pursuing growth and fiscal balance could result in the safety net being
neglected, as happened under the Koizumi government. Pursuing growth and a
safety net—the latter being, perhaps, politically necessary for the former
—could delay the achievement of a balanced budget even further than it has al-
ready been. (The Koizumi government set a target of 2011, which cannot now be
achieved, thanks to the Aso government’s stimulus packages.) The DPJ’s focus
will likely lead it to prioritize a social safety net and fiscal balance, but it is diffi-
cult to see how the government will be able to finance a safety net without
growth over the medium term, as Japan’s baby boomers retire.
BECOMING A NORMAL NATION
Just as the DPJ will try to “normalize” Japan’s system of government and econ-
omy, so too will it try to normalize Japan’s foreign relations.
What exactly does a “normal” foreign policy mean for Japan? Some scholars
have argued that it means a Japan freed of Cold War–era restraints on its security
policy. Arguably, though, this interpretation misses what Ozawa sees as the es-
sential point—that Japan’s external dependence on the United States has been
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equivalent to its politicians’ longtime internal dependence on the bureaucracy.
Just as dependence on the bureaucracy has deprived politicians of the ability to
make decisions necessary for Japanese society, so too has dependence on the
United States interfered with Japan’s foreign policy behavior.29
Ozawa has at times been criticized for what some Americans believe are
anti-American views. But it may be a mistake to read Ozawa as anti-American.
Ozawa’s goal is a Japan able to make decisions on the basis of its leaders’ calcula-
tions of the national interest, not of pressure from the United States—or any
other international actor, for that matter. His goal, and that of the DPJ as a
whole, is to expand Japan’s freedom of international action.
What will this mean for U.S.-Japan relations and Japanese foreign policy in
the near term? In the first year, when the relevant enabling law expires in January
2010, the DPJ will likely bring its Maritime Self-Defense Force refueling ships
home from the Indian Ocean. One month into the Hatoyama government, there
has been no final decision on Afghanistan policy—and indeed, Akihisa
Nagashima, the parliamentary secretary for defense, was reprimanded by De-
fense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano
for speaking out of line when he argued in a speech that the government ought
to extend the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean.30 The government appears
to be giving serious thought to the best way to support the reconstruction of Af-
ghanistan as the Barack Obama administration debates its own approach in
light of General Stanley McChrystal’s request for an additional forty thousand
troops and of Afghanistan’s tainted election. The Hatoyama government will
likely provide greater civilian support for the governments of Afghanistan and
Pakistan in place of a mission involving Japan’s armed forces.
The new government has also decided that it will press for early negotiations
on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, especially the controversial Marine
Corps air station at Futenma. After a decade of talks, the United States and Japan
agreed in 2006 to a “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” which stipu-
lated the relocation of eight thousand Marines and their dependents from Oki-
nawa to Guam but also tied progress on relocation to the construction of a new
air station at Henoko Bay—a “Futenma Replacement Facility”—on land cur-
rently part of the Marine Corps’s Camp Schwab. 31 The roadmap became law in
2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then–foreign minister
Hirofumi Nakasone signed an agreement on its implementation. Among other
things the agreement reaffirmed the importance of Futenma for the realignment
process: “The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the
Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Fa-
cility as stipulated in the Roadmap.”32
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The Democratic Party of Japan—to say nothing of the Social Democratic
Party of Japan—has expressed its opposition to the roadmap. In principle, the
DPJ wants U.S. bases removed from Okinawa entirely; in its 2008 Okinawa vi-
sion paper it called for the dramatic reduction of U.S. forces, first from Okinawa,
then from Japan entirely.33 While the vision paper does not constitute an official
policy statement for the Hatoyama government, it shows that the DPJ is united
in its opposition to the realignment as currently planned.34 Even the DPJ’s con-
servatives—the party’s most enthusiastic supporters of the alliance—are op-
posed to the roadmap. Seiji Maehara, a leading hawk serving concurrently as the
minister of land, infrastructure, and transport and minister responsible for Oki-
nawa, said after a visit to the island in early October that it would be necessary
for the Hatoyama government to launch a fundamental review of the plan to
build a Futenma replacement at Camp Schwab.35
At the same time, however, the new government is fully aware of how difficult
it will be to revise the realignment process. The process may be delayed: as Ad-
miral Timothy Keating, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, admit-
ted in November 2008, “It’ll take a little bit longer to effect—we won’t be done by
2014, or maybe even 2015, but it’s about a decade in execution.”36 With the re-
alignment roadmap enshrined in a bilateral treaty and preparations under way
on both Okinawa and Guam, the Hatoyama government will have a hard time
implementing the DPJ’s Okinawa vision. Acknowledging this reality, in its elec-
tion manifesto the party softened the language on realignment, saying that it
would “look to revise” the realignment of U.S. forces and the arrangement of
American bases in Japan.37 Since taking power the Hatoyama government has
been no less willing to reconsider its approach to Okinawa and Futenma. The
government still hopes for changes to the plan; far from dropping the issue,
Okada said within days of taking office that he wants to reach a new agreement
with the United States on Futenma within the year, so that necessary expendi-
tures can be included in the 2010 budget.38 Nonetheless, senior officials have
clearly backed away from more radical revisions to the roadmap. After a visit to
Okinawa, Kitazawa said building a Futenma replacement elsewhere would be
“difficult.” Hatoyama himself has remarked, when asked about Futenma, that it
may be necessary to back away from proposals included in the DPJ manifesto.
The foreign ministry is currently reviewing the government’s options, with an
eye toward having a proposal ready for when President Obama visits Japan in
mid-November.
For its part the Obama administration has softened its own tone on Futenma. A
State Department spokesman shortly after the election ruled out the possibility of
renegotiating the roadmap, but since then senior administration officials have
stressed their willingness to listen to the new Japanese government’s concerns
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about the agreement. The White House may yet reject a Hatoyama government
proposal out of hand—a distinct possibility after Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates visited Japan and said in regard to Futenma that “it is time to move
on”—but it appears that it will at least try to minimize conflict over the issue.39
There is a certain political logic to the Hatoyama government’s decision to
address these thorny bilateral issues in its first months in office. The closer the
government gets to the 2010 upper-house election—in which the DPJ will try to
win a majority to complement its majority in the lower house—the less it will
want foreign-policy issues crowding its agenda. Other things being equal, the
Japanese public is largely inattentive to foreign policy; foreign and security is-
sues never rank as top priorities in public opinion polls. But the Hatoyama gov-
ernment could suffer political consequences if it is seen as incapable of
responsibly managing Japan’s foreign relations, especially the alliance with the
United States. It is unclear whether the public approves or disapproves of the
government’s policies regarding Afghanistan and Futenma, but if they result in
bilateral strife, the DPJ could suffer at the polls.
Accordingly, the Hatoyama government is trying to distance itself from the
LDP’s approach to the alliance and to devise its own way of dealing with the
United States while at the same time signaling to Washington and to the Japa-
nese public that the relationship is safe in its hands. It is imperative that the
American administration not overreact to the DPJ’s new approach to the alli-
ance, especially with respect to the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. That
mission began in 2001, arising as much out of Japan’s lingering guilt over its
“checkbook” diplomacy during the 1991–92 Gulf War as out of desire to support
the United States after 9/11. By 2007, when the DPJ was able to block tempo-
rarily the extension of the enabling law, there remained little importance sym-
bolically and even less materially; if anything, it shielded Japan from having to
make a more substantive financial or political contribution to coalition activi-
ties in Afghanistan. Replacing the refueling mission with civilian assistance
would be an easy way for the new government to show that, unlike recent LDP
governments, it does not view every foreign policy challenge as an opportunity
to stretch the limits on the use of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). As Ichiro
Fujisaki, Japan’s ambassador in Washington, reminded the Obama administra-
tion after Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell “encouraged” Japan to continue
the refueling mission, “Japan’s international contribution is for Japan to decide
independently.” Ending the refueling mission may be the most painless way for
the Hatoyama government to signal a break with the past.
The same may not apply to Futenma and realignment, which entail serious
material costs for both governments. The roadmap is the result of years of pains-
taking negotiations by American officials, and the U.S. government is
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understandably reluctant to scrap what it views as the best possible arrange-
ment. But Washington should understand the DPJ’s perspective, which sees the
agreement signed by the Aso government as paying inadequate attention to the
environment of Henoko Bay and the interests of local residents. Given that the
realignment process is already behind schedule and that everything hinges on
replacing Futenma, it may be appropriate for the United States to take seriously
the DPJ’s desire for renegotiation, especially since the Hatoyama government
has admitted that any revisions to the deal will not involve moving remaining
Marines off Okinawa.
Underlying both of these Hatoyama government policies is the idea that the
U.S.-Japan alliance is on the cusp of a new era. From 1996 onward officials in
both countries sought to take the Cold War alliance, once described as “a paper
alliance that could be, and was, run virtually from desktops and filing cabinets,”
and transform it into an alliance modeled on the “special relationship” between
the United States and Great Britain.40 After the trade wars of the early 1990s, offi-
cials focused once again on the security relationship, starting with a 1996 joint
security declaration and continuing with a 1997 revision of the guidelines for se-
curity cooperation.
Today it is unclear just how different the 1996 alliance was from that of the
Cold War. The Koizumi government’s decision to support the United States in
Afghanistan within weeks was a momentous decision, but as previously argued,
it had as much to do with making up for Japan’s mistakes in 1991 as with fighting
terrorism. The Koizumi government may have put “boots on the ground” in
Iraq, but its JSDF detachment depended on the troops of other countries to de-
fend it, suggesting that the deployment was less a departure than met the eye.
Article IX of the Japanese constitution remains intact, and the efforts of the
Shinzo Abe government (2006–2007) to introduce even minor modifications to
the constitutional interpretation prohibiting Japan from exercising its right of
collective self-defense were scrapped as soon as Abe resigned. Since the early
2000s Japan has cut its defense budget, notwithstanding several “hawkish”
prime ministers.
The advent of the Hatoyama government will likely mean the end of the
security-centered 1996 alliance. The United States and Japan will continue to
cooperate in security affairs, of course, but the geographical and operational
scope will be more limited than officials in both countries had hoped earlier this
decade. The DPJ and the new government have no interest in constitution revi-
sion, an issue that vanished from the agenda after Abe made it the centerpiece of
his party’s losing campaign in 2007. Hatoyama and other DPJ leaders are instead
interested in exploring new avenues of bilateral cooperation, notably
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cooperation against climate change and nuclear nonproliferation.41 In particu-
lar economic cooperation is back on the agenda: the DPJ manifesto included a
proposal for a U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement. That may be difficult if not im-
possible to achieve in the foreseeable future, but its inclusion in the party mani-
festo is revealing. For the DPJ the key to building an “equal” relationship with
the United States means exploring cooperation in areas other than security, be-
cause ultimately an equal partnership with the United States in that realm is im-
possible, given the asymmetries in capabilities.
But the DPJ’s thinking on the alliance cannot be separated from its broader
thinking on foreign policy. Hatoyama sees Japan’s foreign-policy dilemma thus:
“How can Japan, caught between an America struggling to remain a hegemon
and a China wanting to be and planning to be a hegemon, maintain its political
and economic autonomy and defend its national interests? The international en-
vironment in which Japan will be placed from now on is not straightforward.”42
The Hatoyama government, like the Abe, Fukuda, and Aso governments be-
fore it, faces a structural challenge in East Asia. Japan, like Australia, South Ko-
rea, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
has close and indispensable security ties with the United States, but it also has in-
creasingly important economic ties with China. Japan, like the other countries
of the region, is in no position to choose between the United States and China.
Both Abe and Aso, despite belonging to the conservative wing of the LDP, which
is notoriously skeptical of Chinese power, worked to build a “strategic, mutual”
relationship with China; Yasuo Fukuda, as prime minister (2007–2008), was
even more enthusiastic than the two conservatives. While Abe tried to balance a
new relationship with China with efforts to enhance security cooperation
among East Asia’s democracies, his successors focused more on China than on
cooperation among democracies that excluded China.
Fukuda offered perhaps the most articulate vision of where Japanese foreign
policy in the region ought to be going, and there are a number of similarities be-
tween Fukuda’s ideas, as expressed in a May 2008 speech on foreign policy, and
Hatoyama’s, as laid out in an essay published in September 2009. Fukuda’s an-
swer to the dilemma described by Hatoyama was remarkably similar to
Hatoyama’s: his lengthy speech devoted but one paragraph to the U.S.-Japan al-
liance, in which he stressed the alliance’s value in providing stability and re-
gional “public goods.”43 He did not stress an alliance based on common values or
on other such ideas that have been floated. Japan’s future, Fukuda argued, is in
Asia, but he did not mean “Asia” as a code word for China—he meant Asia as a
whole, including but not limited to China. In effect, cooperation with Asia
would serve as a means of increasing Japan’s freedom of action vis-à-vis both
China and the United States.
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Much like Australia’s Kevin Rudd (prime minister since 2007), Hatoyama has
come into power pushing a vision for an East Asian community. Again as with
Rudd, it is unclear just how much acceptance Hatoyama’s ideas will win in the
region. It is one thing to accept in principle the value of a regional community,
but it would be quite another for countries to pool their sovereignty, which the
ASEAN members have struggled to do even among themselves, let alone with
the region’s larger states. Notwithstanding, if some of Hatoyama’s specific pro-
posals for cooperation in Asia are far-fetched—Hatoyama has admitted that his
ideas are a “dream”—it is clear that a DPJ government will continue Japan’s
movement to status as an Asian middle power, in that—like Australia, South Ko-
rea, and the ASEAN countries—Japan will have to balance its relationships with
the region’s two giants. As Okada said recently, “Two-sided debates like America
or Asia, America or China are futile debates.”44 Under the Hatoyama govern-
ment, Japan will continue to move in the direction of what a Japanese scholar
calls “middle-power diplomacy” and a Western author calls the “Goldilocks
consensus”—but might be called simply the DPJ’s “new realism.”45
Japan’s new leaders, taking power in the midst of wrenching changes at home
and abroad, are in a position similar to that of the men who led Japan in the early
years following the Meiji Restoration (in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury), and that of Shigeru Yoshida (prime minister 1946–47 and 1948–54) and
the other architects of the postwar order. They have to reconfigure Japan’s insti-
tutions at home to manage the country’s changing demographics and alter the
obsolete postwar growth model, while also modifying the country’s foreign pol-
icies (and foreign policy–making institutions) in light of China’s rise. Like
Yoshida, the Hatoyama government will undoubtedly find value in preserving
the security relationship, in part because stagnant defense spending gives Japan
few options—and because the United States still appears to be willing to allow
Japan a cheap, if not free, ride on its defense spending (although one question
for the future is whether the United States will be willing to tolerate this for
much longer, given its own financial situation). Like Yoshida, the Hatoyama gov-
ernment recognizes that Japan’s leadership abroad begins at home: that until Ja-
pan returns to economic normalcy, it will struggle to lead in the region. And like
Yoshida (nicknamed “One Man,” for his “dictatorial” tendencies), Hatoyama
and other DPJ leaders recognize that leadership at home and abroad requires in-
stitutions that enable politicians to lead.
Some analysts have argued that for better or worse, the DPJ’s victory will leave
Japan largely unchanged.46 This view seems mistaken. Arguably the DPJ
changed Japan simply by defeating the LDP in a general election and winning an
absolute majority in the House of Representatives, showing the LDP’s 1955 sys-
tem had been finally and irrevocably destroyed. The Democratic Party of Japan
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having won on the back of support from independents and Liberal Democratic
defectors, its victory arguably suggests that Japan has entered into a period of in-
tense partisan competition and further changes of government (once the LDP
sorts itself out), a period in which successive governments will be desperate to
introduce and implement new policies to sell themselves to voters and tie the
hands of their successors in the event of electoral defeat.
But beyond that, the DPJ’s plans for changing Japan’s policy-making process
constitute a genuine revolution in how the country is governed, and they open
the way to far-reaching reforms in domestic and foreign policy. Whether or not
its policies leave Japan better or worse off, the Hatoyama government’s plans
could result in an undeniably transformed Japan. At the very least, Japan is on
the brink of a period of policy experimentation not unlike Japan’s “openings”
after the Meiji Restoration and the American occupation.
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